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JUDGES, JURIES, AND PATENT CASES
AN EMPIRICAL PEEK INSIDE THE
BLACK BOX
Kimberly A. Moore*

Honest to God, I don't see how you could try a patent matter to a jury.
Goodness, I've gotten involved in a few of these things. It's like some
body hit you between your eyes with a four-by-four. It's factually so
complicated.
- Judge Alfred V. Covello1
INTRODUCTION

The frequency with which juries participate in patent litigation has
skyrocketed recently. At the same time, there is a popular perception
that the increasing complexity of technology being patented (espe
cially in the electronic, computer software, biological and chemical
fields) has made patent trials extremely difficult for lay juries to un
derstand. These developments have sparked extensive scholarly de
bate and increasing skepticism regarding the role of juries in patent
cases.2
* Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. B.S.E.E. 1990, M.S.
1991, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1994, Georgetown. I am grateful to Anita
Bernstein, Theodore Eisenberg, David Hyman, Bruce Kobayashi, Leandra Lederman, Mark
Lemley, Clarisa Long and Matthew Moore for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
work. I wish to thank the Statistics Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
with special thanks to Maurice Galloway for providing a starting point for my research. I
would also like to thank the many research assistants who helped with data collection and
Marilyn S. Murphy and Susan G. Dorsey for statistical help. For additional information or
comments, the author can be contacted at kamoore@gmu.edu.
1. Judicial Panel Discussions on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1 127, 1144
(1993) (statement of Judge Covello, U.S. District Judge, Dist. of Conn.).
2. See, e.g., THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 107 (1992) [hereinafter ADVISORY REPORT] (discussing

problems with jury trials of patent cases); Fourth Biennial Patent System Major Problems
Conference, 34 IDEA 77 (1994) [hereinafter Major Problems Conference] (twenty-nine
prominent patent practitioners and professors debate the role of the jury in patent cases);
John B. Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction
Concurrent with that of the District Courts?, 32 Haus. L. REV. 67, 70-84 (1995) (reporting
that principal complaints regarding adjudication of patent suits are unpredictability, delay,
and expense); Edmund L. Andrews, A 'White Knight' Draws Cries of 'Patent Blackmail,'
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1990,§ 3, at 5 (calling a jury trial of a patent case "a 'judicial lottery,' an
often unpredictable system that can yield huge rewards for those who are sufficiently aggres
sive"); Richard B. Schmitt, Juries' Role in Patent Cases Reconsidered, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
1 994, at B6 (quoting patent attorney Donald Dunner as saying, "Give Llurors] a complicated
biotechnology case or one involving lasers or computers, and their eyes glaze over," and Pro
fessor Martin J. Adelman as saying that jury confusion has created "a system of justice that is
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Juries have participated in some aspects of patent litigation since
the enactment of the first patent statute in 1790, which provided for
"such damages as shall be assessed by a j ury."3 The enactment of the
Patent Act of 1870, however, which gave equity courts the power to
award common law damages,4 spawned an era in which patent cases
were almost exclusively decided by the bench. This pattern has
changed only recently - and the change has been dramatic. In 1940,
2.5 % of all patent cases tried in district court were heard by juries.5
From 1968 to 1970, the figure was almost unchanged at 2.8%.6 By con
trast, from 1997 to 1999, 59% of all patent trials were tried to juries.7
This surge in jury requests has prompted a flurry of recent litigation
over the right to a jury trial in patent litigation.8

basically a lottery"). As Judge Nies stated in her dissent in In re Lockwood, "No more im
portant nor contentious an issue arises in patent law jurisprudence than the appropriate role
of juries in patent litigation." In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 515 U.S. 1 182 (1995).
3. Act of April 10, 1790, ch.7,§ 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
4. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230,§ 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206.
5. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
ANNUAL REPORT 109 tbl. 8 (1941). 1940 was the first year these statistics were compiled.
6. In 1968, 3.7% of the cases that went to trial (4 of 108 cases) were tried to a jury.
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANNUAL
REPORT 209 tbl. C4 (1968). In 1969, 2.1 % of the cases that went to trial (2 of 95 cases) were
tried to a jury. DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 222 tbl. C4 (1969). In 1970,
2.6% of the cases that went to trial (3 of 116 cases) were tried to a jury. DIRECTOR ADMJN.
OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 245b tbl. C4 (1970).

7. In fiscal year 1997, 52% of all patent cases (54 out of 103) were tried to a jury.
U.S. CTS., JUD. Bus. U.S. CTS. 153 tbl. C4 (1997). In fiscal year 1998, 60% (62
out of 103) of all patent cases were tried to a jury. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs., JUD. Bus. U.S.
CTS. 167 tbl. C4 (1998). In fiscal year 1999, 62% of all patent cases (61 out of 98) were tried
to a jury. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., JUD. Bus. U.S. CTs. 161 tbl. C4 (1999).
ADMIN. OFF.

8. The Federal Circuit recently has had three occasions to consider whether the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial applies to certain aspects of patent litigation. The first
was the 1995 case, In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir .), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995), in
which the Federal Circuit held that there was a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial of
validity issues in a declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court vacated this decision
after the plaintiff withdrew his request for a jury trial. The second was the en bane decision
in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996), which addressed the Seventh Amendment right to have a jury interpret patent
claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit decision that the construction of
patent claims is a task exclusively to be performed by the judge. The Court found that a
judge, with her legal training, is better equipped than a jury to construe patent claims.
Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-89. The third, also in 1995, was another en bane decision, Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co. , 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17
(1997), in which the Federal Circuit held that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
is a question of fact to be decided by the jury, rather than a question of law to be decided by
a judge. The Supreme Court declined to decide conclusively whether this issue should be
decided by a judge or jury, instead offering what it termed "guidance" to help facilitate uni
formity and reliability. Hilton Davis, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. The Court encouraged greater par
ticipatio n by the judge, more frequent use of summary judgment, and increased use of spe
cial verdict forms and interrogatories. Id.
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Despite extensive debate over the role of the jury in patent cases,
no comprehensive empirical research has been done to ascertain, to
the extent possible, the differences between jury and judge resolution
of patent cases and the cause of the increased demand for j ury trials in
recent years. Given that patent litigation is an expensive endeavor it routinely costs each party in excess of a million dollars9 - there is an
urgent need for empirical evidence on patent litigation. This Article
undertakes that task by providing the first large-scale comparison of
patent-holder win rates and recoveries in cases tried before j uries and
judges. The data include all patent cases that went to trial in the period
from 1983 through 1999 (seventeen years of data).10 This time period
was selected in order to analyze, among other things, the impact the
creation of the Federal Circuit may have had on the resolution of pat
ent trials in the district courts.11 Accordingly, each of these cases was
followed through to appeal to ascertain the issues appealed and the
9. The American Intellectual Property Law Association conducted an economic survey
in 1995 that examined the total cost of a patent infringement suit from filing to final adjudi
cation, including all attorneys' fees, court costs, and other expenses. The analysis was broken
down by geographic area and cost of litigation. In California, the median legal costs for a
patent litigation were $2,493,000. 1999 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N,
REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 72 tbl. 22.
10. Details on the acquisition of this data set are provided in Part II. The data set in
cludes every patent case that went to trial in the United States from the period 1983-1999 as
reported to the Administrative Office of the Courts. I have personally verified the substan
tive issues resolved by the factfinder in each of these cases.
1 1 . The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 by the merger of the United States Co urt of
Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See Federal Courts Im
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).

368

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:365

relative affirmance rate by issue, by adjudicator, and by year. The data
were analyzed to determine whether popular perceptions or theoreti
cal models about j udges and j uries can be validated, to provide de
scriptive statistical data, and to develop predictive models from the
data through regression analysis.
At first blush, the results of the study suggest that complaints about
jury bias and incompetency are unfounded. Judges and j uries decide
some issues differently. For example, j uries are significantly more
likely to find patents valid, infringed, and willfully infringed than
judges. The differences, however, are not as profound or pervasive as
one might expect. Judges and j uries find patents enforceable with
similar frequency. Additionally, juries seem as "accurate" in their de
cisionmaking as j udges are, as measured by appellate affirmance rate.12
And yet, despite similar affirmance rates for judge and j ury trials,
there is some ground for concern with j ury resolution of patent cases.
To a greater degree than j udges, j uries tend to decide whole suits
rather than delineate individual issues, even when separate issues are
presented to them via special verdict forms or interrogatories. This
finding suggests that judges are subtler at managing the complex na
ture of patent cases and the technical distinctions between patents and
products. It may also affirm the popular perception that j uries are un
duly swayed by tangential factors.
In addition, who filed the suit is a significant predictor of win rate
in jury trials. Juries are significantly pro-patentee in suits for infringe
ment (68% patentee win rate); but when a possible infringer initiates a
declaratory j udgment action, the patentee only has a 38% win rate. If
the same were true of j udges, then one could attribute the difference
in win rate to the strength of the cases - namely, that alleged infring
ers only bring declaratory judgment suits when they have strong cases.
But patentee win rates are substantially uniform in bench trials, re
gardless of who initiated the suit.
These data suggest that there may be some problems with juror
adjudication of patent suits, though the system masks them. Deferen
tial standards of review leave the Federal Circuit with little ability to
disturb potentially flawed jury decisions. Moreover, the system lacks
sufficient transparency to ascertain flaws in j ury verdicts. The "black
box" nature of jury verdicts leaves the Federal Circuit unable to cor
rect inaccuracy or bias on the part of jurors. This reality - particularly
in light of the increase in jury adjudication of patent disputes and the

12. I do not mean to suggest that the mere lack of disturbance on the part of the Federal
Circuit of tried issues on appeal indicates that the factfinder reached the "accurate" or right
result. The most that can be said about the high affirmance rate is that the Federal Circuit
could not conclude that the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence (on fact
questions) or that the court's decision was not clearly erroneous (on fact questions). This
issue is discussed more fully infra notes 125-132 and accompanying text.
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potential for jury error where increasingly technical inventions are in
volved - highlights the value of a peek inside the black box.
Part I of the Article presents popular impressions of judge and jury
outcomes in patent cases - in particular, popular perceptions of juror
incompetence and bias - and considers how win-rate data might con
firm or refute these beliefs. Part I also discusses selection effect theory,
an economic model of the case selection process, and how win-rate
data may be affected by parties' knowledge of adjudicator biases. Part
II describes the data set, its acquisition, and the methodology used to
analyze the data. Part III tests the impressions of judge and jury out
comes in patent cases against the empirical data. It presents descrip
tive statistics, the hypotheses, and the results of the regression models.
Part III also discusses what insight the data lend on the role of the jury
in the adjudication of patent disputes.
I.

I MPRESSIONS OF JU D GE AND JURY OUT CO MES

A. Popular View: Juror Incompetence
The increased participation by juries in patent cases and the de
tailed attention given by the judiciary has caused a number of scholars
and other commentators to question the propriety of jury resolution of
patent cases. In this Part, I discuss the perceived wisdom regarding ju
ries in patent cases. Typical complaints about the use of juries in pat
ent cases include: juries are unable to comprehend the technology13 or
the nuances of the legal standards for patent validity and infringement;
juries are pro-patentee14 - they favor inventors and have a high re
gard for the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office ("PT0");15 juries are bi
ased in favor of domestic companies;16 juries award excessively high
damage awards;17 and juries are swayed too easily by tangential fac-

13. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
14. See Allan N. Littman, The Jury's Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases:
Markman, Hilton Davis and Beyond, 37 IDEA 207, 209 (1996) (stating that juries favor the
patent holder); Major Problems Conference, supra note 2, at 82 (quoting patent attorney
Don Dunner: "I am privy, as other [sic] of you may be, to some statistics in Delaware. The
last fourteen patent jury cases tried in the District of Delaware, all resulted in holdings in
favor of the patent owner except for one, which was a hung jury, and that does not bode well
for the system. I don't think jurors by and large are capable [of] doing the job nearly as well
as judges").
15. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
16. See Jack L. Lahr, Bias and Prejudice Against Foreign Corporations in Patent and
Other Technology Jury Trials, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 405, 405 (1992) ( A widespread perception
"

within the corporate communities of many industrial countries holds that they will be treated
unfairly in U.S. jury trials due to the jury bias and prejudice against foreigners.").

17. See Timothy L. Swabb, Federal Circuit Cannot Stop Runaway Jury Awards in Patent
Suits; Companies Should Insure Themselves Against this Risk, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.:
PATENTS, Sept.

5, 1995, at 11, 11.
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tors.18 Jury consultants believe that juries do have distinct biases and
preconceptions in patent cases.19 These popular perceptions of juror
incompetence and bias have caused commentators to argue that the
role of the jury in patent litigation should be severely limited, and
many alternatives have been proposed.20
Although purely anecdotal, the following transpired between a
judge and the jury in an antitrust case which involved, what was at the
time, complex technology after the jury returned its verdict:
The Court:
Juror A:
The Court:
Juror B:
The Court:
Juror C:
The Court:

Do you know what demand substitutability is, [Juror A)?
Well, I would like to kind of look into that.
Okay. And how about the barriers to entry, [Juror B)?
I would have to read about it. . . .
All right. And how about reverse engineering, [Juror C)?
That's when you would take a product and you would al
ter it in a, or modify it for your own purpose; that is, you
would reverse its function and use it in your own method.
And [Juror D], what is software?

18. See Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent
Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO . L. REV. 623, 623 n.4, 624 (1996); Swabb, supra note 17,
at 13.

19. Decision Quest, a trial consulting firm specializing in jury behavior and trial strategy,
has conc luded that juries believe that:
- regarding the patent itself, patents are almost impossible to get, the information in them is
secret, they last forever, and they can't be invalidated;
- regarding the patent process, patent applications are thoroughly reviewed by the Patent
Office, and patent applic ants don't lie;
-regarding patent suits and the claims and defenses raised, patentees are expected to vigi
lantly enforce their patents in a timely manner, plaintiffs often overdefend validity and wind
up hurting their case, inequitable conduct is a difficult defense because the patent office im
partially and diligently reviews each application, it is an important defensive tac tic to provide
an alternative motivation for the plaintiffs suit, and the "human" aspect of the case story is
more important than the details of the technology and infringement evidence;
- regarding corporations , big companies stealing ideas from one another is commonplace,
patents hurt competition between corporations, and it is not untisual for a company to
change one or two things and then call it a new idea; and
- regarding inventors , they are idealized by the jury, they are often victimized by powerful
companies , and the more an inventor can be personalized in the case, the greater the impact
on the jury.
Nic holas M. Cannella & Timothy J. Kelly, Jury
LAW INSTITUTE, PATENT LITIGATION 1993,

Trials and Mock Jury Trials, in

PRACTICING

at 731, 741-42 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property, Handbook Series No. G-375).
20. See, e.g., Richard P. Cusic k et al., A Critical Analysis of the Proposed National Patent
Board, 13 J. OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 461 (1997) (endorsing a proposal for an industry

spo nsored National Patent Board ("NPB") to resolve patent infringement disputes); Lei
bold, supra note 18 (recommending the creation of a specialized trial court or panels of ex
pert juries to resolve patent cases); Major Problems Conference, supra note 2; Pegram, supra
note 2 (discussing inadequacies in patent infringement adjudication system and proposing
that the U.S. Court of International Trade be given patent c ase jurisdic tion); Franklin Strier,
The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 49 (1997) (pro
posing use of specially qualified juries in c ases such as patent litigation where the lay jury is
ill-equipped to deal with the complexity of the issues being tried); Tom Arnold, Why is ADR
the Answer?, COMPUTER LAW, July 1998, at 13 (suggesting that Alternative Dispute Resolu
tion would be better than judge or jury resolution of patent c ases).
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Juror D:
The Court:
Juror D:
The Court:
Juror D:
The Court:
Juror D:

It's software.
Well, what is software?
That's the paper software.
What's the hardware?
That's the wires and hardware.
And what is - do you know what an interface is?21
Yes.

The Court:
Juror D:

Can you given me an example of that?
Well, if you take a blivet, turn it off one thing and drop it
down, its an interface change, right?22

This apparent lack of comprehension of the underlying technology ex
emplifies the fears many harbor about jury resolution of patent cases.
As technology becomes increasingly complex, especially in the soft
ware and biotech fields, concerns would naturally escalate over a lay
jury's ability to comprehend the technology in order to resolve the
suits. These complaints often revolve around the educational make up
of the jury.23 For example, after a jury ruled that AT&T had infringed
a small company's patent, lawyers for AT&T complained that the jury
consisted of "unemployed laborers and housewives [who] did not un
derstand that stuff."24 Despite increasing complexity of technology and

21. An interface is the connection between a computer and an auxiliary piece of equip
ment. This concept was discussed at length during this trial.
22. Record a t 19,490-91, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423
Cal. 1978), affd sub nom. on other grounds, Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d
1 188 (9th Cir. 1980).
(N.D.

23. For example, following the antitrust trial quoted above, see supra text accompanying
note 22, the district court judge noted that only 1 out of 11 jurors had even limited technical
education. See /LS Peripherals, 458 F. Supp. at 448. Here is another example of attention to
jurors' educational backgrounds:
After three years of trial preparation, almost a month of courtroom battle and six hours of
jury deliberation, the patent trial between inventor Raymond Damadian and General
Electric Co. appeared to have come to a climax. "We have reached a decision," the bailiff
said, reading the message from the jury to a hushed audience of lawyers who had rushed in
to brace for the verdict. "We need more Diet Coke." GE's attorneys didn't smile at the at
tempted humor. Nor were they amused two hours later when the jury delivered a real
punchline: A $110.5 million verdict against GE for infringing on two patents covering mag
netic resonance imaging technology. GE's not alone in being touchy on this issue. The
Fairfield, Conn.-based manufacturer is only the latest company to get walloped by a big jury
verdict in a patent suit. And like most corporate defendants, GE took its wrath out on the ju
rors, saying the panel "apparently acted on emotion, not facts or law" by favoring an under
dog inventor over a deep-pocketed corporation. Corporate defendants and patent lawyers

have long griped that intellectual property litigation is too complex to leave to plumbers,
housewives, mailmen and music teachers.

Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial, CHI.

WL 6216112 (emphasis added).

TRIB.,

June 12, 1995, at 6, available at 1995

24. Schmitt, supra note 2; see also ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 2, at 107 (asserting
that comprehending patent trial principles is very demanding on the factfinder); Steven I.
Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 N w. U. L.
REV. 190, 193-98 (1990) (arguing that dissatisfaction with the jury system exists because of
two conflicting expectations - that the jury should be (1) an accurate decision maker, and
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the corresponding patents that protect it, there is no minimum educa
tional requirement for serving on a jury in a patent case - "blue rib
bon" or expert juries are not mandated, regardless of technical com
plexity.
If juries are unable to understand the technology or apply the law,
then their decisions will be based on emotional or other irrelevant fac
tors. 25 Who tells the better story? Who is the more likeable or sympa
thetic party? Many commentators suspect that the party who demands
a jury in a patent case has a weaker case26 and therefore prefers an
adjudicator less likely to focus on the merits.
Many attorneys believe that juries are mesmerized by the inven
tor's story and tend to favor the patentee.27 Juries respond well to de
scriptions of the inventive process and the inventor's flash of genius or
slow methodical trial and error. Whether it is Bob Kearns taking on
the automotive industry over his intermittent windshield wipers28 or
Jerome Lemelson suing Mattel over "Hot Wheels,"29 juries appear to
love inventors. If this is true, we would expect to see higher win rates
for patentees than for alleged infringers in jury trials.30
There is a popular perception that jurors are more likely than
judges to defer to the administrative patentability determinations
made by the PT0.31 Juries may be impressed with the blue ribbon on
(2) impartial - although impartiality virtually requires that jurors do not possess the training
or experience necessary to deal with issues requiring specialized knowledge).
25. See Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial, supra note 23 (quoting GE attorneys
as stating that the jury "apparently acted on emotion, not facts or law"); infra note 36
(quoting a Chief Patent Counsel as saying, "Jurors' decisions are based on emotional percep
tions of good guy vs. bad guy.").
26. 1 ETHAN HORWITZ & LESTER HORWITZ, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE &
TACTICS§ 2.02[6), at 2-21 to 2-22 (1995) ("[C)ourts suspect some weakness on the merits of
the case of the party who puts a patent case on the jury docket."); Schmitt, supra note 2
(quoting Martin Adelman: "There are many lawyers who believe they can benefit by jury
confusion.").
27. See, e.g., Jonathon Taylor Reavill, Tipping the Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape
of Equity in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 366 (1996) (stating
that "juries also tend to idealize inventors"); Barry S. Wilson, Patent Invalidity and the Sev
enth Amendment: Is the Jury Out?, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1787, 1787 n.4 (1997) (asserting

that juries prefer individual inventors challenging large corporations or foreign defendants);
Andrews, supra note 2 (observing that juries "have proven eager to side with inventors
against large companies").

28. A jury awarded Robert Kearns $19 million for Chrysler's infringement of his inter
mittent windshield wiper patent. High Court Refuses to Hear Verdict Appeal by Chrysler,
WALL ST. J., March 21, 1995, at B7. After a second jury found Ford liable for infringement,
Ford settled with Kearns for $10.2 million. Id.
29. An Illinois jury awarded Jerome Lemelson $25 million in his 1989 action against
Mattel over "Hot Wheels." Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (reversing jury finding of infringement).
30. Unless the parties accurately factor this bias into predictions and settlements. See

infra Section J.B.

31. See 1

HORWITZ & HORWITZ,

supra note 26, at§ 2.02[6), at 2-21.
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the cover of a patent and the fact that the patent was reviewed by an
"expert agency" with technically trained examiners. Moreover, juries
are instructed that an issued patent carries a presumption of validity
that can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. Judges,
on the other hand, may harbor more skepticism about agency accuracy
and may be willing to scrutinize agency decisions closely. If this is true,
we would expect patent-holder win rates on validity to be higher in
jury trials than bench trials.
In 1999, I conducted a survey of forty-seven Chief Patent Counsels
of leading corporations32 and found that this group had little confi
dence in juries' ability to understand the technology in patent cases
and, interestingly, not much more confidence in the ability of judges.33
In addition, the respondents believed that juries award higher dam
ages than judges do,34 that juries are more likely to uphold the validity
of a patent,35 and that juries are biased in favor of the patent holder.36
If the jury is not an ideal adjudicator, the question is who should
step in and resolve patent cases? There are some who believe that ju
ries should continue to resolve patent cases because they are compe
tent to do so or because there is no evidence to suggest that judges

32. This survey was conducted at the 1999 annual conference of the Association of Chief
Patent Counsels. In order to be a member of this organization and attend the conference,
you must head the intellectual property legal group (Chief Patent Counsel) of a corporation
which has at least five full-time intellectual property attorneys on staff. The average level of
experience of this survey group was 25.3 years of practice. In fact, all but three of the re
spondents had at least 15 years of experience practicing patent law.
33. I asked the respondents to quantify on a scale of 1-10 (with 10 being very confident)
their level of confidence in the jury's ability. When asked, "Are juries able to understand
technology in patent cases?," the respondents' answers averaged 3.7. There were many
comments written on the survey such as this one from a Chief Patent Counsel with more
than 30 years experience, "JURIES JUST PLAIN CAN'T DECIDE PATENT CASES
PERIOD. . . . THIS IS HOPELESS." Many of the Chief Patent Counsels surveyed believed
that juror decisionmaking was often swayed by tangential or emotional issues such as attor
ney personalities, likeable witnesses, etc. One Chief Patent Counsel with 35 years experience
commented, "I have won and lost cases with juries, and in both situations, the jury reasoning
was not related to the facts."
In response to the question, "Are judges able to understand the technology in patent
cases?," the confidence level was only 5.6.
34. In response to the question, "Do you think that juries generally award higher dam
ages than judges? YES or NO, " 86% of the respondents answered YES (38).
35. In response to the question, "Do you believe juries are more likely to hold a patent
valid?," 85% (40) believed the jury was more likely to uphold the validity of a patent, 15%
(7) believed that there was an equal chance of validity or invalidity and 0% believed juries
were more likely to hold a patent invalid.
36. When asked, "Do you think jurors are biased in any of the following ways: Jurors
favor the patent holder (inventor)? YES NO," 86% of the respondents (37) answered YES.
One Chief Patent Counsel with 25 years experience characterized her confidence in juries as
follows: "Most jurors' attention span is too short to assimilate and analyze the conflicting
information presented by opposing counsels. Jurors' decisions are based on emotional per
ceptions of good guy vs. bad guy."
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would be better at resolving these cases.37 In fact, Chief Judge Mayer
of the Federal Circuit, commented: "[T]here is simply no reason to
believe that judges are any more qualified than juries to resolve the
complex technical issues often present in patent cases. "38 There are
more than 600 active district court judges and more than 200 senior
district court judges. With only 2000 patent cases being filed each year
and only approximately 100 of these reaching trial,39 a district court
judge's exposure to patent cases is very limited. Most judges have no
special knowledge, education or training in the technology that is at
issue in a patent case. It has even been suggested that a jury may be
better equipped to resolve a patent case: whereas judges generally
must divide their attention among several cases, a jury can focus exclu
sively on the one patent case presented to it.4° Finally, some have ar
gued that patent law is not unique in terms of its complexity; other
fields of law have equal or greater technological and legal complex
ity.41
Popular perception suggests that jurors are not capable of resolv
ing patent cases; that their decisionmaking will be based on emotional
or tangential factors or bias. If juries are biased in favor of the patent
holder and are not competent to comprehend patent cases as many
suggest, the data ought to reflect a high win rate for the patent holder
when the jury adjudicates patent cases.
B.

A Theoretical Model: Selection Effect Theory
(The 50% Implication)

For the rate of plaintiff verdicts to be an accurate measure of the influ
ence of a legal standard, ofjudicial or jury attitudes, or of the substantive
fairness of any adjudicatory process, litigated disputes must be represen
tative of the entire class of underlying disputes. 42

For example, a measure of patentee outcome rates in tried cases
would only confirm popular perceptions that juries are pro-patentee, if
the tried cases are a random subset of all disputes. Most scholars
37. See, e.g., Howard T. Markey, On Simplifying Patent Trials, 116 F.R.D. 369, 372
(1987); supra text accompanying note 33.
38. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer,
C.J., concurring).
39. See infra Table 1 and accompanying text.
40. See Greg J. Michelson, Note, Did the Markman Court Ignore Fact, Substance, and
the Spirit of the Constitution in its Rush Toward Uniformity?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1707,
1734 (1997) (arguing that judges are not better than juries at deciding patent cases because
they have relatively little experience with patent cases, no technical expertise, and may be
distracted by other trials).
41. See Markey, supra note 37, at 372.
42. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
1, 4 (1984) (emphasis added).
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agree, however, that the small percentage of all legal disputes that
reach trial is not a representative or random sampling of all cases.43 To
predict the selection of cases for trial, several formal economic models
have been developed.44
George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein present a selection effect
model of the litigation process that predicts that the tendency for
plaintiffs to prevail at trial will approach a probability of 50% as the
fraction of cases going to trial approaches zero.45 This theory is predi
cated on parties making rational determinations regarding whether to
settle or litigate, based on economic factors such as: the potential gain
from a favorable outcome and the potential loss from an adverse one,
the estimated likelihood of success at trial (including both the likeli
hood of success under the applicable legal standard and the likelihood
that the decisionmaker will reach an accurate result),46 and the transac
tion costs (litigation costs).47
According to this model, the disputes that proceed to trial are the
cases in which the parties substantially disagree on their chance of suc
cess, which is most likely to happen when the case falls close to the
governing decision standard (that is, where the estimated outcome ap
proaches 50% ) .48 When the legal rule or the adjudicator clearly favors
one side, economically rational behavior dictates that the parties
should settle to avoid transaction costs.49 The cases that proceed to
trial are likely the difficult or close cases in which the parties are more
likely to disagree on the predicted outcome. These close cases should
43. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights
and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1568 (1989) (describing "expectations theory," which

suggests that tried cases might not reflect the pool of all disputes); KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
58 (2d ed. 1951) (commenting that liti
gated cases bear the same relationship to the underlying pool of disputes "as does homicidal
mania or sleeping sickness, to our normal life").
THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAw AND ITS STUDY

44. See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go To Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predic
tors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 322-24 (1999) (discussing three formal

models for predicting the selection of cases for trial: divergent expectations, asymmetrical
stakes, and asymmetrical information). Each of the economic models for predicting case se
lection is predicated on one or more assumptions that may not be present in actual cases.
These assumptions include: (1) risk neutrality of the parties; (2) equal stakes; (3) equal in
formation; ( 4) identical outcome estimation; and (5) lack of strategic behavior. Id.
45. Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 19-20.
46. The selection effect model allows for "divergent expectations" of the parties in esti
mating outcome. For example, a patent holder may believe that she has a 60% chance of

winning the case on the merits, whereas the alleged infringer, with the same information,
evaluates the patent holder's chance of success at 40%. Under such circumstances, both par
ties may be unwilling to settle the case. The selection effect model allows for these self
serving estimation errors but assumes that the errors are random and based on differences of
opinion rather than asymmetrical information.
47. Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 4.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Alternatively, one would expect these cases to be resolved by the judge on disposi
tive motion. In either event, they are unlikely to proceed to trial.
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fall more or less evenly on both sides of the decisional standard re
sulting in a 50% win rate.50
There are two ways to utilize this economic model to make predic
tions regarding patent-holder win rates.51 First, selection effect theory
suggests that the empirical data regarding patent-holder win rates at
trial ought to approach 50% regardless of who the legal standards fa
vor or what biases exist in the adjudication system. Considering
whether this simple economic model will accurately predict patent
holder win rates in tried cases requires thinking about how patent
cases may deviate from the purified assumptions of the model. Second,
selection effect theory suggests that there ought not to be any signifi
cant differences in resolution of these cases by judges and juries since
any biases that exist for the adjudicator would be factored into the
outcome predictions in the determination of what cases to take to trial.
1.

Assumptions Underlying the 50% Model

Many empirical studies have failed to substantiate the 50% predic
tion.52 The win rate tends to be closest to 50% among those cases that
conform most closely to the underlying assumptions of the Priest/Klein
model.53 First, the model is an "all or nothing" model where damages
are stipulated and only liability is in issue.54 Moreover, the model as50. Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 3.
51. Several scholars have found it useful to test this model using a database that com
pares the characteristics of cases that went to trial and settled cases. See, e.g., Lederman, su
pra note 44 (using a database of settled and tried Tax Court cases to confirm that cases are
not randomly selected for trial and identifying five independent variables - whether the
case went through an IRS appeals process, the dollar amount at stake, and three characteris
tics about the judge - that were statistically significant in predicting an increased likelihood
that a case would go to trial); Jeffrey M. Perloff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Settlements in Private
Antitrust Litigation, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 149 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988)
(confirming a nonrandom selection of antitrust cases for trial and identifying predictors of
settlement based on surveys sent to parties that settled). The characteristics of settled versus
tried patent cases are not compared to validate selection effect theory (which would be a
very useful endeavor), but rather evaluate patent-holder win rates to determine if they sub
stantiate any of the economic models.
52. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial By Jury or Judge: Tran
scending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1175-76 ( 1992) (only 23 of 93 types of

bench trials and 16 of 93 types of jury trial show plaintiff win rates from 45% to 55% );
Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Ap
proach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 236-42 ( 1996) (dis
cussing 20 empirical studies which have found plaintiff win rates not approximating 50%,
summarizing the numerous empirical studies that have tested the 50% rule, and concluding
that the win rate is closer to 50% among cases that conform more closely to the underlying
assumptions of the Priest/Klein model). Some commentators have argued, however, that
these deviations from the 50/50 prediction can be explained by deviations from the underly
ing assumptions. E.g. , Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the
TriaVSettlement Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 17,
27 (David A. Anderson ed., 1996).
53. See Kessler et al., supra note 52, at 257.
54. See Kobayashi, supra note 52, at 17.
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sumes equal stakes,55 symmetrical information,56 risk neutrality,57 and
lack of strategic behavior.58 To the extent that one or more of these as
sumptions does not hold true for a given set of disputes, the outcomes
may not approximate 50%.
At least one of these assumptions does not hold true in patent
cases.59 If the parties have differential stakes in the outcome, litigation
is more likely when the party with greater stakes has a higher prob
ability of success. When the plaintiff stands to gain by winning the ex
act amount the defendant will lose, the win rate should approximate
the decisional standard (50% ), if the parties have accurate information
about success rates. When the stakes are greater to one party, more
victories for that party ought to be observed in litigated disputes.60
In patent cases, the stakes are frequently asymmetrical. A patent is
by its nature a public right. It is not a private contract between two
parties, but rather a property right that impacts all competition in a
given technology. In most competitive markets, the patent holder has
a much greater stake in the outcome of the litigation than does the al
leged infringer. A limiting claim construction for the patent holder
could insulate many non-parties from future infringement or, if the in
fringer succeeds on its defenses of invalidity or unenforceability, the

55. See id. at 29 (stating that "[o]ne of the most common explanations of deviations from
the fifty-percent rules is the existence of asymmetric stakes"); Kessler, supra note 52, at 257
(finding that "differential stakes . . . affect[] win rates in the manner that the theory would
suggest").
56. See Evan Osborne, Who Should Be Worried About Asymmetric Information in Liti
gation?, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 399 (1999) (finding that asymmetric information does
exist in cases that proceed to a decision and it that generally favors the defendant, by testing
how litigants fare after trial relative to their expectations).

57. A party is risk-neutral if they are indifferent between a guaranteed settlement
amount of $6000 and proceeding to trial with a 60% chance of winning $10,000. A risk
averse party would settle for less than $6,000 to avoid the risk. See W. Kip Viscusi, Product
Liability Litigation With Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 103 (1988) (determining, in
products liability cases, "how the decisions to drop and to settle a claim are affected by risk
aversion, as well as how risk aversion affects the settlement amounts").
58. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study ofSettlement Nego
tiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH . L. REV. 319, 328 (1991) (stating that

strategic behavior by a party is an attempt to capture more of the surplus from the settle
ment range); Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Per
mit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 259-60 (1999)
(stating that finding a settlement range depends on the absence of strategic behavior).

59. There are many identifiable real-world complications that could alter the expected
outcome for this economic model, such as strategic behavior by the parties, the risk aversion
or neutrality of the parties, asymmetrical information, a focus in the dispute on damages
rather than liability, or differing abilities of counsel. None of these complications, however,
exists for patent cases (any more than for any other type of case) in a systematic and predict
able way which would cause the need to alter the prediction of the economic model.
60. See Kobayashi, supra note 52, at 37 (noting a bias in the selection of cases towards
the repeat litigant - that is, the party with the higher stakes).
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patent will no longer be enforceable against anyone.61 This loss is sig
nificantly greater than the monetary damages the infringer would have
paid.62
If these asymmetrical stakes are systematic and predictable, then
we would expect to see a higher patent-holder win rate from the em
pirical data. Because the patent holder stands to lose more than the
defendant, the patent holder will be more risk-averse to trial. Hence,
the patent holder will settle close cases (to avoid bad precedent or an
invalid patent) and try only those cases it estimates it will win. In light
of the systematic asymmetrical stakes present in most patent disputes,
the empirical results should implicate a higher win rate for the patent
holder (greater than 50% win rate for the patent holder).
2.

Selection Effect Theory Predicts Similar Win Rates for
Judge and Jury Cases

Under the selection effect theory, judge and jury patent-holder win
rates should not reflect bias, even if juries may be biased in all of the
popularly perceived manners, because the parties would factor these
biases into the outcome estimations, and settle accordingly.63 Hence,
the selection effect theory forecasts similar win rates for patent hold
ers before judges and juries. The parties' selection of cases to take to
trial would therefore incorporate the litigants' stereotypical views
about judge and jury biases. Regardless of whether the overall patent
holder win rate is 50% or higher than 50%, the win rate should not dif
fer substantially in judge and jury cases. Even though there are sys
tematic differential stakes in patent cases, these differential stakes ap
ply equally to cases adjudicated by judge or jury. Deviations from the
underlying assumptions are generally useful in explaining empirical re
sults inconsistent with the economic model. These deviations, how
ever, do not generally explain differences between judge and jury

61. In a two-supplier market, the stakes might be closer to symmetrical. In such a mar
ket, the patent holder would stand to win in damages exactly what the infringer would stand
to lose. Whether the infringer wins the suit by succeeding on a defense of non-infringement
or a defense that the patent is invalid or unenforceable is irrelevant. Regardless of how the
suit is lost, the patent owner only loses the exact amount of money it would have won from
the defendant (because there are no other potential infringers to sue).
62. But the accused infringer may also have more at stake than the monetary damage
award because of the injunctive relief that is almost guaranteed if the patent holder succeeds
in the suit. In some circumstances, the injunction could dramatically upset the commercial
status quo by forcing the infringer out of the market entirely.
63. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 1 130 ("[A]ccording to this selection effect
theory, any judge/jury distinction that the parties evaluate without systematic inaccuracy
should not lead to a difference in win rates before judges and juries."); Priest & Klein, supra
note 42, at 4 ("(P]otential litigants form rational estimates of the likely decision, whether it is
based on applicable legal precedent or judicial or jury bias.").
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patent-holder win rates, because they do not vary with the mode of
trial.64
II.

THE STUDY

Despite increasing skepticism regarding juror comprehension and
bias in patent cases, no comprehensive research has been done to as
certain the differences between judge and jury resolution of patent
cases or the cause of the increased demand for jury trials in patent
cases.65 Very little empirical or economic research has been performed
on the function and impact of the patent system.66 This Article pro64. Professors Clermont and Eisenberg concluded that factors developed within the con
text of selection effect theory and routinely used to explain deviations from the 50% rule
(such as differential stakes) carry little weight because they do not vary with the mode of
trial. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 1 130-31. Minor differences between judge and
j ury win rates could arise if a difference existed in the ability of the parties (or their attor
neys) to assess their chances of success with different adjudicators. See Donald Wittman,

Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Genera
tion ofBiased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 325-28 (1988) (discussing effect of

differential assessments generally on win rate).

65. Although no detailed empirical analysis has been undertaken to ascertain whether
judges and juries behave differently in patent cases, it has been done for other fields. See,
e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Clermont &
Eisenberg, supra note 52. Kalven and Zeise) surveyed trial judges about jury verdicts in cases
over which they presided in an attempt to ascertain how often the judge and the jury would
have reached the same result. The study concluded that judges and juries agreed on outcome
in a large number of personal injury cases, but that jury verdicts averaged 20% higher than
the judges' awards would have been. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra, at 64 & n.13. Moreover, the
study concluded that juries were not more pro-plaintiff than were judges and that there was
no statistically significant difference in disagreement between judge and jury in difficult ver
sus easy cases, indicating that complexity did not affect outcome. Id. at 157. Clermont and
Eisenberg compared win rates before judges and juries in product liability and medical mal
practice cases to conclude that neither the popular perception that juries are pro-plaintiff nor
the academic theory that win rates should equalize was supportable. Clermont & Eisenberg,
supra note 52, at 1 173.
66. A 1987 study examined whether patents encouraged innovation across various in
dustries and concluded that, in some industries, patents were not an effective means of en
couraging innovation. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Re
search and Development, in 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987); see
also Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1995) (find
ing that the higher the patent enforcement costs (litigation costs), the less likely biotech
companies are to patent new inventions). More empirical research needs to be done to vali
date the existence of the patent system as a mechanism for encouraging innovation. The uni
verse of empirical studies pertaining to patent litigation is very small. There are two out
standing studies that were conducted prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit. P.J.
Federico studied validity and infringement data for litigated cases from 1948-1954 and found
that appellate courts invalidated patents 63 % of the time and district courts invalidated pat
ents 54% of the time. P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 233,
236 tbl. 2, 237 tbl. 4 (1956). Gloria Koenig studied cases reported in the United States Patent
Quarterly ("U.S.P.Q.") from 1953 through 1977 and found that findings of validity or inva
lidity were reversed in 35% of the cases in which validity was an issue. See GLORIA K.
KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS § 4.02, at 4-41
n.35.2 (rev. ed. 1980). Koenig also noted the wide variation among the Circuits in the treat
ment of validity. See id. at 4-33 to 4-36. This variation among the regional circuits in their
treatment of validity and the forum shopping that resulted were the impetus for the creation
of the Federal Circuit in 1982. There have also been studies examining the Federal Circuit's
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vides the first large-scale comparison of patent-holder win rates before
judges and juries.
A.

The Data Collection: The Administrative Office of the Courts

The Administrative Office of the United States Courts compiles
statistics on filed and terminated cases by subject matter. When a pat
ent case is terminated, the district court files with the Administrative
Office67 a form that includes the dates of filing and termination of the
suit, the judicial district, the procedural stage of the termination (e.g. ,
by court action prior to trial, by the parties in a settlement, or after a
trial), the method of disposition (e.g. , default judgment, consent judg
ment, jury verdict, bench trial), whether the case was tried to a judge
or jury, who prevailed in the suit (plaintiff or defendant), and what re
lief was granted. The data set consists of the population of tried cases
from 1983 to 1999. The data reflect 1411 cases that reached trial, 1209
of which were resolved by the factfinder. This latter figure includes
533 jury trials and 676 bench trials.68 In these trials, 1948 individual
patent claims were tried, 1676 of which were ruled on by the factfinder
(781 by jury trial and 895 by bench trial) . This includes every jury trial
that has taken place in the last 17 years.69
treatment of patents, most notably a study testing whether the Federal Circuit was more pro
patentee than its predecessor courts. Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Fed
eral Circuit's Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151 (1995). Finally, a recent study
by Professors John Allison and Mark Lemley collected a database of written validity deci
sions reported in the U.S.P.Q. from 1989-1996 (239 cases). John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998).
The authors determined that patents were found valid in 54% of the cases in their data set.
Id. at 205. Among other things, the authors provide useful validity statistics by issue, i.e., by
35 U.S.C. sections 101, 102, 103, and 112. Id. passim. In addition, they considered outcome
variation based on variables such as the time the patent was in prosecution, the number of
prior art references considered in prosecution, subject matter of the invention, and domestic
vs. foreign patentee. Id. There is very little overlap between my study and the Alli
son/Lemley study. I do not replicate their detailed analysis of the variables that underlie va
lidity decisions. Also, the Allison/Lemley study did not consider other substantive issues that
arise in patent cases, such as enforceability, infringement, willfulness, or damages. Moreover,
their study considered only written decisions published in the U.S.P.Q., and juries do not
write opinions. Therefore, their pool of jury decisions was limited (73 total) to cases in which
the jury verdict was challenged and the district court generated an opinion regarding judg
ment as a matter of law ("JMOL") or the case was appealed to the Federal Circuit. Id. at
211.
67. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO
JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, Transmittal 64, vol. XI, at 11-19-11-28 (March 1 ,
1985).

68. Cases that reached trial, but were not resolved by the factfinder were resolved on
directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law prior to a final verdict by the factfinder, or
they were settled by the parties during trial.
69. This data set does not include cases resolved by district courts on dispositive motion
which certainly shed light on how judges resolve patent cases. However, jury trial win rates
in which the jury is resolving a disputed issue of fact and judge rulings on dispositive motion
where the judge is deciding that no reasonable juror could conclude differently are not com
parable. A more accurate comparison between judge and jury resolution of cases can be ac-
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Deficiencies in the Data

The data acquired from the Administrative Office ("AO") have
several weaknesses. Their major deficiency is that they do not contain
detailed information about the cases. For example, the AO data are
reported only in terms of plaintiffs and defendants. This creates a
problem in determining a patentee win rate. If a suit is a declaratory
judgment action brought by the infringer, rather than a patent in
fringement suit, the data that report judgment for the plaintiff is actu
ally judgment for the infringer rather than the patentee. While 14% of
all patent trials were declaratory judgment actions, detailed verifica
tion prevented this method of reporting from skewing the outcome
rates.
Another limitation in the data is that they only indicate which
party won the suit, not the basis upon which the case was decided.70 In
addition, the Administrative Office provides very little data on the
amount of the damage awards. Only damage awards up to $9,999,000
are recorded. Hence a $200 million damage award is reported the
same way as a $10 million damage award.71
Finally, a few reported cases were eliminated from the data set.
Some were not patent trials. For example, a case would be classified as
a patent trial, yet the patent claims might have been dismissed by dis
positive motion and the only issue actually tried dealt with antitrust or
copyright or trade secret. Since these suits were not patent trials, they
were eliminated from the study. Duplicate cases were also elimi
nated.72

quired by limiting the analysis to cases where each adjudicator resolved a material issue of
fact after a trial. These "close" cases provide the best insight into whether judges and juries
decide cases differently (comparing apples to apples). Comparing win-rate data at various
stages of litigation (such as when cases are resolved by the court on dispositive motion) and
at what stage in the litigation courts generally resolve patent cases is the subject of further
research I am currently performing. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:
Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
70. A judgment for the defendant, for example, could indicate a finding of non
infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability.
71. Occasionally, I discovered inconsistencies in the way the damage award was re
ported to the Administrative Office. While some jurisdictions reported the actual damages
awarded by the factfinder, others apparently reported the final amount paid to the victor.
This amount would include prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, attorneys' fees, and
treble damages for willfulness. The damage awards used in this study were limited to the
award granted by the fact-finder. For more detailed explanation, see infra (section on dam- ·
ages].
72. Consolidated cases which went to a single trial were often reported twice because of
the existence of two separate docket numbers. I have eliminated these duplications from the
data set. When a case actually resulted in more than one trial because issues were bifurcated
or because a second trial was required after the appeal was remanded, the case is actually
reported twice.
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The Collection Process

I sought to verify the Administrative Office data and to fill in the
missing data by researching each of the decisions reported to the Ad
ministrative Office. These data were obtained by locating opinions
related to the case or news reports, special verdict forms, district court
orders and judgments, complaints, and docket sheets from the district
courts. When reported district court or appellate decisions detailing
the trial court proceedings could not be located, I contacted the courts,
the parties, or the attorneys who represented the parties and obtained
judgment sheets, courts orders, and verdict forms. In the small number
of instances in which verification of whether a particular issue was
tried was not possible, it was excluded from the data set.73 For each
case, the following information was collected:
• Party names and docket number.
• Date the suit was filed and date of termination.
• Judicial district in which the proceedings occurred.
• Stage of proceedings when the termination occurred and the
manner of the termination (summary judgment, settlement, mo
tion to dismiss, trial, etc.).
• Whether the adjudicator was judge or jury.
• Which party prevailed in the suit (patentee or alleged infringer74).
• Which party was the patentee.
• How many separate claims were tried (multiple patents or multi
ple accused products).
• Whether the factfinder found the patent valid or invalid.75
• Whether the factfinder found the patent enforceable or unen
forceable.
• Whether the factfinder found the patent infringed or not in
fringed.
• Whether the factfinder found the patent willfully infringed or not
willfully infringed.

73. For example, if the case discussed the infringement determination made by the
court, but did not mention whether validity was tried because the resolution of that issue was
not appealed or not discussed in the court opinion, I included no information in the study
regarding validity of that case.
74. Throughout the results and tables, I will refer to the alleged infringer as "the in
fringer" for brevity.
75. When patents are issued by the PTO, they are presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282
(1994). Accordingly, the alleged infringer has the burden of proving the patent invalid by
clear and convincing evidence. Since patents are already valid, when validity is challenged,
the court holds the patent invalid or not invalid. But for brevity, I refer to patents as adjudi
cated valid or invalid throughout the tables and results.
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The amount of damages awarded (not including costs, interest, at
torneys fees or trebling).
• Whether and how much the district court enhanced damages after
a finding of willfulness.
• Whether there was an appeal to the Federal Circuit and, if so,
whether the factfinder's decisions were affirmed or reversed.
The population consisted of 1 4 1 1 cases comprising 1948 separate
patent claims.76
•

Ill.

THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The popular view expects greater success for patent holders in pat
ent litigation before juries than for patent holders in litigation before
judges. The economic theory, however, forecasts similar success rates
for patent holders regardless of adjudicator, assuming that parties
have equally accurate information about both. Does either of these
views explain the increased demand for jury trials in recent years? The
empirical evidence suggests that juries are more likely to hold for the
patent holder on some issues, substantiating the popular view. It also
exposes some shortcomings of jury decisionmaking which may not be
measurable from appellate affirmance rates.
Surprisingly, few patent cases go to trial each year. For the period
of the study, the percentage of patent suits going to trial each year
ranged from 3.3% to 1 1 .9%. The percentage of suits going to trial for
the entire period was 6.9% . Table 1 contains statistics detailing patent
suit resolutions and trials.

76. This number reflects the entire population of patent trials, not a sample study that
chooses a limited number of trials or only reported trials. There were 1411 patent cases that
made it to trial, but only 1209 of these were actually resolved by the factfinder. The other 202
were either settled during trial, or the court ruled on directed verdict or JMOL prior to
resolution by the factfinder. If JMOL occurred after the jury verdict, the original jury resolu
tion is reported.
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TABLE l
YEAR

Patent Suits
Terminated77

# of Patent
Trials78

% of Patent Cases
Going to Trial

# of Jury
Trials

% of Trials
to a Jury

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

940
995
988
1088
1031
1122
1248
1124
1097
1315
1461
1513
1509
1697
1828
2034
2191

1 12
90
85
89
89
108
105
96
86
90
94
90
89
101
103
103
73

1 1.9
9.0
8.6
8.2
8.6
9.6
8.4
8.5
7.8
6.8
6.4
5.9
5.9
6.0
5.6
5.1
3.3

24
23
20
26
37
54
38
34
39
52
47
64
47
54
60
62
49

21
26
24
29
42
50
27
35
45
58
50
71
53
53
58
60
67

The vast majority of suits are resolved in advance of trial either by the
court on dispositive motion or by the parties themselves through set
tlement.79 Increasingly, the patent cases that do progress to trial have
been tried to a jury rather than to a judge. Why has jury resolution of
patent cases increased so dramatically in recent years? Has the jury
become better or more accurate at adjudicating these cases? Has the
jury become increasingly biased in favor of the patent holder on liabil
ity or more favorable on damages? A jury trial will result if either side
requests one. If neither side requests a jury, the trial proceeds before a
judge. If juries are biased in the manner popularly perceived, it is a
wonder that there are ever any bench trials. Why would the patent
holder ever forgo this valuable advantage?80 This section explores pos
sible explanations for the increased use of juries in patent cases and
dissects, as much as possible, judge and jury resolution of patent cases

77. This column includes every patent case that was terminated by any means (settle
ment, motion, trial, etc.).
78. This column includes only those cases that ended after a trial was begun. These
numbers include cases resolved by the factfinder at the conclusion of trial, cases resolved by
directed verdict or JMOL, and cases that settled after the trial had begun.
79. For example, in 1998, 24% of cases were resolved without court action, 59% of cases
were resolved by court order or judgment on a motion, 12.5% were resolved after the pre
trial conference but before trial, and 4.5% of all cases were resolved during or after a trial.
80. I am presently conducting research to examine characteristics of bench trials to de
termine whether there are any statistically significant predictors for the type of cases in
which neither party requests a jury.
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in the last seventeen years in light of popular perceptions and eco
nomic theory on win rates.

A.

Overall Patentee Win Rates

As shown in Figure 2, of the 1209 patent trial decisions in the data
set, the patentee won 58% of all suits (706 cases) and the alleged in
fringer prevailed in 42% (503 cases).81 These data indicate a statisti
cally significant difference in overall win rate for the patentee and in
fringer. Hence, we can reject with 99% confidence the null hypothesis
that either party has an equal chance of winning a patent lawsuit.82

81. A case was considered won by the patentee if the patentee won at least one patent
claim in its entirety. If the patentee claimed two patents were infringed and the court con
cluded that one of the two patents was valid, enforceable, and infringed, it was considered a
verdict for the patentee, even if the other patent was held invalid or not infringed. If, how
ever, the infringer prevailed on any issue with respect to each claim, it was considered a ver
dict for the infringer. For example, if the patent was held valid and enforceable, but not in
fringed, this case would be considered won by the infringer.
82. In this study, I generally test a null hypothesis which would posit "no difference" in
outcome or "no relationship" between events. In this case the null hypothesis would be "pat
entees are not more likely to win patent suits than alleged infringers." The p value (also
called significance level) is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually
true. A rejection of null hypothesis with a p value p<.001 indicates that there is less than 1
chance in 1000 of erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis of equal predicted win rates. This
would translate into a confidence level of 99.9%. Hence we could reject the null hypothesis
with 99.9% confidence. A rejection of the null hypothesis with p<.01 is 99% confidence. A
rejection of the null hypothesis with p<.05 is 95% confidence. Throughout this Article, I use
the term "significant" in the formal statistical sense, indicating that the null hypothesis can
be rejected with at least 95% confidence (p:5.05). If p>.05, I conclude that observed differ
ences or relationships are not statistically significant; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
in these cases. I have tested these null hypotheses using chi-square analysis (the "Pearson
statistic") which provides an inverse measure of the likelihood that the difference in means
show real difference in win rate rather than random variation.
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TABLE 2: PARTY WIN RATE SUIT-BY-SUIT
Patentee Prevails
Infringer Prevails

TOTAL

All Decisions

Jury Decisions

Judge Decisions

706 (58%)
503 (42%)
1209

363 (68%)
170 (32%)
533

343 (51 %)
333 (49 %)
676

I also considered whether these results would change if overall win
rate was determined based on a claim-by-claim analysis rather than a
suit-by-suit analysis. A claim-by-claim analysis involves considering
the win rate on each patent and product separately. Those results are
as follows:
TABLE 3: PARTY WIN RATES CLAIM-BY-CLAIM
Patentee Prevails
Infringer Prevails

TOTAL

All Decisions

Jury Decisions

Judge Decisions

933 (56%)
743 (44%)
1676

495 (63%)
286 (37 %)
781

438 (49%)
457 (51 % )
895

These data suggest that there is little difference between examining
case win rates and claim win rates. When the jury is the adjudicator,
the patent holder prevails in 63 % of all claims and 68% of all suits.
When the judge is the adjudicator, the patent holder succeeds in 49%
of all claims and 51 % of all suits.

There is a significant difference in win rate when the jury decides
patent claims. Hence, the null hypothesis that "when a jury decides a
patent claim there is an equal chance of success for the patent holder
and the infringer" can be rejected. There is not a significant difference
in the win rate, however, when the patent case is decided by a judge
(51 % win rate). The null hypothesis that "when a judge decided a pat
ent claim there is an equal chance of success for the patent holder and
the infringer" cannot be rejected. The identity of the adjudicator,
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therefore, is a statistically significant predictor of who wins the claims
in the lawsuit.83
At least initially, the patent-holder win rates follow the pattern
predicted by popular perception - namely, higher win rates for the
patent holder in jury trials, but not in judge trials. It would seem that
the overall patent-holder win rate of 58% could be explained either by
the notion that jury biases favor the patent holder, or by the selection
effect theory, which predicts a patent-holder win rate above 50% to
reflect the differential stakes that exist in patent cases. The data do not
support the economic model, however, when broken down by judge
and jury. The economic model predicted similar win rates for judges
and juries because the parties factor known biases of the adjudicators
into the determination of whether to try a case. In jury cases, the win
rate exceeds 68% . Again, one might argue that this is attributable to
differential stakes in the suit that would cause the patentee to only try
cases it has a high probability of winning and that correspondingly,
there ought to be a high patentee win rate. This explanation for the
higher win rate should be equally true in bench trials, however, but it
is not. Bench trial adjudication would support the basic Priest/Klein
50% hypothesis only if there were no systematic differential stakes in
these cases. The empirical results suggest that the purified model with
its simplistic assumptions does not reflect the reality of patent dis
putes.
Professors Clermont and Eisenberg, in their study of product li
ability and medical malpractice cases, also observed a significant dif
ference in judge and jury win rates.84 Their data revealed a signifi
cantly higher win rate for plaintiffs in judge trials, contradicting
popular perceptions of pro-plaintiff jury bias.85 They considered possi
ble explanations for observable differences in judge and jury resolu
tion of cases and concluded that misperceptions about adjudicators
could explain differences in adjudicator win rates.86 If the parties per
ceive the jury as biased in favor of the patent holder, but the jury turns
out not to be biased, then cases that the parties assess to be close cases
will actually be losers for the patent holder. If the parties perceive the
jury to be bias in favor of the patent holder, but they do not accurately
assess the magnitude of the juror bias, apparently close cases could ac
tually be routine winners for the patent holder. Misperceptions re
garding the severity of adjudicator bias could be the reason for differ83. A simple linear regression indicates that whether the adjudicator is a judge or jury is
a statistically significant predictor of who wins both by suit (�=.174; t=6.172; p=.000) and by
claim (�=.144; t=5.997; p=.000).
84. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 1137.
85. Id. at 1137-38.
86. Id. at 1170-74 ("[T]he parties must inaccurately perceive the realities of judge and
jury trial.").
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ences in judge and jury win rate in patent cases, and, at least in patent
cases, this misperception may well be tied to the rapid increase in jury
demands.
Figure 4 shows that win rates in judge trials have remained rela
tively constant over the years. Jury win rates fluctuate over time87 and
do not reveal a trend towards increasing patent-holder win rates,
which might have explained the increase demand for jury trials. It does
not appear as though changes in win rates over the last seventeen
years can explain either the increase in juror resolution of patent cases
or the difference in judge and jury win rates, unless the answer lies in
the fluctuation itself. Perhaps bench trial win rates approximate 50%
because judges are more consistent, allowing the parties to evaluate
more accurately their relative win rates before a judge. The most im
portant assumption of the Priest/Klein model is that parties form ra
tional estimates of likely outcome based on applicable legal precedent
and adjudicator bias.88 The Priest/Klein model assumes that if parties
are making outcome estimation errors, the errors are homoskedastic,
that is, independent of each other and random.89 As party estimation
error diminishes, the patentee win rate should approach 50% .90 Stated
another way, if the parties are unable to estimate outcome predictably
because of a lack of clarity in the legal standard that will be applied or
because of unpredictability in the adjudicator's application of the legal
standard, then their estimation error will be higher and the tendency
towards a 50% outcome prediction less certain.

87. Such apparent fluctuation in win rate can be explained to some degree by the low
number of instances of jury trials in the early years of the study (20-30 per year). With a
small number of jury trials a few outcomes can significantly impact the win rate for the year.
88. See Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 4.
89. See Kobayashi, supra note 52, at 23.

90. See Priest & Klein, supra note 42, at 19.
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The seventeen-year time line for judge resolution of patent trials
shows a relatively steady patent-holder win rate over the years. This
indicates that judges' behavior in adjudicating patent disputes has fol
lowed expected patterns. Such predictability allows for more accurate
outcome estimation by parties, which will result in an outcome rate
closer to the decisional standard (50% ). However, with jury resolution
of patent trials being considerably less predictable during the
seventeen-year time line (due in part to the relatively small number of
jury trials that traditionally occurred), parties are less capable of accu
rately estimating outcome. If, however, the parties realize that the jury
is less predictable and that their outcome estimations are less accurate,
one would expect the settlement range for both sides to increase and
thereby reduce the number of cases going to trial. Moreover, there is
no reason to believe error would be systematically skewed in one di
rection.
The phenomenon of jury resolution of patent cases is relatively
new. As the parties and their attorneys become more experienced with
jury resolution of patent cases, outcome estimation error will likely
diminish, and there should be a progressive convergence toward an
observable 50% outcome.91 Estimation error decreases with experi
ence under a legal standard because the legal standard becomes more
defined over time with experience; it becomes more predictable and
more certain.92 A jury may never be like a legal standard, because ju
ries are one-time players in the litigation game and have no opportu
nity to learn from or build on past juror experiences or reasoning. If
popular perception holds true, juries may be biased in ways that defy
predictability. One can predict jury biases in favor of the patent
holder, but it is more difficult to quantify juror incompetence to re
solve technical matters or juries being swayed by emotional or tangen
tial issues in a case.
B.

Substantive Issues Tried

In order to dissect further each patent trial and isolate the issues
that affect win rates before judges and juries, the 1209 cases going to
trial in the data set are broken down by substantive issue: validity, en
forceability, infringement, willfulness, and damages. A decision on one
91. Priest and Klein describe this implication as follows:
[A] n

important determinant of the ex tent to which the observed success rate approximates

50 percent will be the parties' error in estimating the outcome. As the parties' error dimin
ishes, the 50 percent proportion of victories will be approached more closely. Since, for ex
ample, we would imagine error to diminish with experience under a legal standard, the ap
proach would imply a progressive convergence toward 50 percent victories after a change in
a rule of law.

Id. at 19.

92. See id.
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of these issues is reported below only if it was made by the factfinder
(resolved at trial).
TABLE 4
Total # of Decisions

Jury

Judge

Validity
Valid
Invalid

1151
67% (775)
33% (376)

551
71 % (389)
29% (162)

601
64% (387)
36% (214)

Enforceability
Enforceable
Unenforceable

530
73 % (387)
27% (143)

206
75% (155)
25 % (51)

324
72% (232)
28% (92)

Infringement
Infringed
Not Infringed

1359
65 % (888)
35 % (471)

706
71 % (503)
29% (203)

653
59% (385)
41 % (268)

Willfulness
Willful
Not Willful

547
64% (349)
36% (198)

318
71 % (227)
29% (91)

226
53% (122)
47% (107)

The results of the study allow confident assertion of the following:
• patents are more likely to be held valid than invalid;93
• patents are more likely to be held enforceable than unenforce
able;94
• patents are more likely to be held infringed than not infringed;95
• patents are more likely to be held willfully infringed than not will
fully infringed;%
• patents are more likely than not to be held valid,97 enforceable,98
infringed,99 and willfully infringed100 when adjudicated by a jury;
• patents are more likely than not to be held valid,101 enforceable,102
and infringed103 when adjudicated by a judge;

93. x'=13s.ss9, df=l, p=.ooo
94. x'=l 12.332, df=l, p=.ooo
95. x'=127.954, df=l, p=.ooo
96. x'=41.684, df=l, p=.ooo
97. x'=93.519, df=l, p=.ooo
98. x'=52.505, df=l, p=.000
99. x'=127.479, df=l, p=.ooo
100. x'=ss.164, df=l, p=.ooo
10i. x'=49.799, df=l, p=.ooo
102. x'=60.494, df=l, p=.ooo
103. x'=Z0.963, df=l, p=.ooo
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either party has an equal chance of winning on the issue of will
fulness when adjudicated by a judge.104
The higher win rate for the patent holder on the issues of validity
and enforceability could reflect the fact that the patent is presumed
valid and that the infringer must therefore prove the affirmative
defenses of invalidity or unenforceability by clear and convincing evi
dence.105 This evidentiary burden is higher than the evidentiary stan
dard of preponderance of the evidence which applies to infringe
ment.106 The patent holder, however, must prove willfulness by clear
and convincing evidence,107 and they are able to do so with great fre
quency when juries are adjudicating the issue.
These findings suggest that the patent holder has an edge on al
most every issue in front of any adjudicator. Patent holders tend to
succeed on the same types of issues before judges and juries, with the
exception of willfulness where the jury is much more pro-patentee
than the judge. The empirical results suggest that the evidentiary bur
den of proof is more meaningful when judges are adjudicating. When
judges adjudicate validity and enforceability, infringers are only suc
cessful 36% and 28% of the time, respectively. Juries conclude patents
are invalid or unenforceable 29% and 25% of the time, respectively.
Patent holders' success rate in proving willful infringement, which also
has the higher evidentiary burden, is 53% when judges are adjudicat
ing the issue. When juries decide willfulness, patent holders are suc
cessful in 71 % of the cases. On the issue of infringement, judges find
infringement in 59% of the cases, reflecting this issue's lower eviden
tiary burden of preponderance of the evidence. Juries find infringe
ment in 71 % of the cases, which, considering the difference in eviden
tiary standards, is remarkably close to juries' findings of willfulness.
This contrast with judges' tendencies suggests that juries may be
•

104. x'=.983, df=l, p=.322
105. See Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("An accused infringer alleging that a claim is invalid must overcome the statutory
presumption of validity that attaches to an issued patent, see 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994), by
proving invalidity by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence."); Elk Corp. of
Dallas v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 168 F.3d 28, 30 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that material
ity and intent for inequitable conduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence).
Not all enforceability issues require clear and convincing evidence. Laches and equitable
estoppel, which are affirmative defenses not challenging the validity of the patent, but rather
the enforceability of it against an individual defendant, require proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R .L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1045 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
106. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 842 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (stating that infringement must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence).
107. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("Willful infringement is a question of fact and must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, for 'the boundary between unintentional and culpable acts is not always bright.' ")
(quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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swayed by bias and may not be giving the evidentiary burden much
significance.
1.

Invalidity and Unenforceability: Not Easy Defenses at Trial

These data reveal the impact that the choice of adjudicator has on
the outcome of each issue. Adjudicator is a significant predictor for
validity108 but not for enforceability.109 Judges and juries uphold the
validity of patents with roughly the same frequency
64 % and 71 %
respectively.110 The fact that there is a significant difference between
judge and jury adjudication of validity substantiates popular expecta
tions that juries are more likely than judges to hold a patent valid be
cause of perceived deference to the PTO. Other studies have indicated
that when judges invalidate patents, they are more likely to do so on a
dispositive motion in advance of trial than in a ruling following a
trial.111 The import of this tendency is obvious: infringers need to put
forth their best case of invalidity prior to trial, because if the case
makes it to trial before either adjudicator, the patentee holds a signifi
cant advantage in challenges to the patent. The data set for the present
study includes only tried cases; it does not include dispositive mo
tions.112 For this reason, it may underestimate the total likelihood of
judicial invalidation.
-

108. �=-.062; t=-2.247; p=.025
109. �=-.036; t=-.919; p=.359
1 10. This is considerably higher than the pre-Federal Circuit statistics of Koenig, who
found that patents were held valid in 42% of cases, and Federico, who found that patents
were held valid (not invalid) in 39% of cases. See KOENIG, supra note 66,§ 4.02, at 4-19 (re
porting that, from 1953 through 1977, 42% of litigated patents were held valid in the district
courts, excluding those cases finding no infringement without ruling on validity); Federico,
supra note 66, at 236 tbl. 2, 237 tbl. 4 (reporting that, from 1948-1954, 39% of litigated pat
ents were not invalidated by the courts of appeals and 48% were not invalidated by the dis
trict courts). My results also differ from the Allison/Lemley study (300 cases from 19891996), which found 54% validity. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 66, at 205. The
Allison/Lemley statistic, however, includes validity decisions rendered by the court on dis
positive motion which resulted in a lower validity rate (on dispositive motion only 28% of 82
patents held valid). See Allison & Lemley, supra note 66, at 212 tbl. 3. Their statistics on va
lidity decided at trial are closer to mine (67% of 73 patents valid after jury trials, 57% of 143
patents valid after bench trials). See id.
1 1 1. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 66, at 212 tbl. 3 (reporting that, in a data set of
published U.S.P.Q. decisions from 1989 to 1996, judges only invalidated patents at trial in
43% of 143 cases, but they invalidated patents before trial in 72% of 82 cases).
1 12. In order to compare accurately judge and jury decisionmaking, I limited the study
to issues resolved at trial, as indicated supra note 76.
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Infringement and Willfulness: Does the Jury Know Them
When It Sees Them?

Adjudicator is not a significant predictor for challenges to the pat
ent's enforceability, but it is a significant predictor for infringement113
and willfulness.114 We can reject (with 99.9% confidence) the null hy
potheses that there is no difference between judge and jury resolution
of infringement and that there is no difference between judge and jury
resolution of willfulness. The fact that juries are significantly more
likely to find infringement and willfulness than a judge suggests that
juries may harbor (as borne out by the outcome data) the popularly
perceived bias in favor of the patent holder. These results could also
support the common skepticism regarding the jury's ability to resolve
complex, technical issues. If juries are less adept than judges at under
standing the intricacies of complex technology, subtle technical differ
ences between an alleged infringer's product and the product(s) cov
ered by a patent may be lost on them - with the result that they find
infringement more frequently.
Juries find willfulness in almost three of four cases (71 % ) and
judges only find it half the time (53 % ), suggesting that juries are more
easily convinced of an infringer's thieving intent. Juries may perceive
the patentee who brings an infringement action as a victim and an in
fringer accused of stealing patented technology, a villain. To find will
fulness, the factfinder must conclude that the infringer intentionally or
flagrantly disregarded the patentee's rights. The outcome data indicate
that juries are more easily persuaded than judges by "bad guy" evi
dence.
After a factfinding of willful infringement is made by the judge or
jury, the judge has the discretion to enhance damages, up to trebling,
and to award attorneys' fees.115 The judge considers many factors in
determining whether to enhance damages for willfulness including
whether the infringer deliberately copied the patented technology, the
infringer's behavior, size and financial condition, and closeness of the
case.116 I examined the percentage of cases in which willfulness is
found, how often damages are enhanced in response to willfulness,
and how much they are enhanced. Judges considered whether to en
hance damages in 219 cases,117 and the mean enhancement amount was
1 13. �=-.123; t=-4.792; p=.000
1 14. �=-.181; t=-4.417; p 000
=.

1 15. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 ("[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed."); id. § 285 ("The court in exceptional cases may award reason
able attorney fees to the prevailing party.").
1 16. See, e.g. , Read Corp. v. Portee, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1 17. In many cases, willfulness was determined by the factfinder in an earlier stage of
the proceedings than damages and/or the determination as to whether to enhance. The will-
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1 .69, indicating a mean of less than double damages when enhance
ment is considered. Table
enhanced by the judge.

5

details the likelihood that damages will be

TABLE S

Enhancement1 18
0
1-1.9
2-2.9
3
Mean Enhancement
Attorney Fees
Awarded

TOTAL

Jury Decided
Willfulness

Judge Decided
Willfulness

219
63 (30%)
23 (11 %)
50 (24%)
74 (35 % )
1 .69
84

136
59 (44%)
15 (11 %)
24 (18%)
3 7 (27 % )
1.33
50

83
4 (5%)
8 (11 %)
26 (35 %)
3 7 (50%)
2.33
34

Who decided that the patent was willfully infringed (judge or j ury) is a
statistically significant predictor of enhancement.119 These data indi
cate that in 95 % of the cases in which the judge found willfulness,
damages were likely to be enhanced; however, when a jury found will
fulness, the judge only enhanced damages in 63% of the cases. Attor
neys fees were awarded to the patentee by the j udge after a finding of
willfulness in 84 cases: 50 in which the j ury decided willfulness and 34
in which the judge decided willfulness. In some instances, attorney fees
were awarded in addition to multiplying damages; in some instances,
attorney fees alone were awarded as an enhancement. These data in
dicate that judges function as a check to temper j ury findings on will
fulness - or that judges simply give themselves more credit in terms
of the likelihood that the willfulness decision is correct.

C.

Damages

1209 tried cases in the data set, the factfinder awarded dam
501.120 These awards are the raw compensatory dollar value

Of the
ages in

fulness finding, along with other issues, was often appealed and reversed or vacated prior to
a decision by the trial court regarding enhancement, or the case settled.
118. Enhancement of 0 indicates no enhancement of the damage award found by the
factfinder despite a finding of willfulness. Enhancement of 1-1.9 indicates that the judge did
enhance damages and the magnitude of the enhancement was 1-1.9. For example, if the pat
ent holder was awarded damages of $100,000, an enhancement of 10% would be 1 . 1 which
would equal a total damage award of $110,000. The maximum allowable enhancement under
the law is treble damages. This would be a 300% enhancement or 3 which would equal a to
tal damage award of $300,000.
119. �=.319; t=5.676; p=.000
120. In cases resolved in favor of the infringer, there generally were no damage awards
reported. In a few instances damage would be decided despite a verdict for the infringer in
order to avoid piecemeal litigation (if there is a reversal at the Federal Circuit or by the trial
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found by the factfinder; they are exclusive of costs, interest, trebling,
or attorneys' fees. To prevent a few exorbitant awards from distorting .
the data,121 the awards are examined in the following groupings:

$0-$500,000; $500,001-$1,000,000; $1,000,001-$5,000,000; $5,000,00110,000,000; $10,000,001 and up.

Although adjudicator Uudge or jury) is a statistically significant
predictor for damages as grouped above,122 the perception that j uries
are much more likely to award multimillion dollar damages seems un
founded. Judges make damage awards in excess of $5 million in 17%
of the cases, and j uries award them in 21 % . Jury awards, as the Figure
shows, are higher than j udge awards, but the magnitude of the dis
crepancy is lower than popularly predicted. This may be attributed in
part to the fact that many parties who fear large j ury verdicts settle
their cases rather than take a chance on a runaway verdict.123

court on JMOL, there need not be a new trial if all issues are resolved). In cases resolved in
favor of the patentee, there often were no reported damage awards because damages were
stipulated, the case settled, or damages were bifurcated and not reported.
121. These results are reported in thousands:
Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation
6541
1093
Jurv
19802
4426
531
Judge
14573
As the enormous standard deviation indicates, utilizing the mean or median damage awards
would not be a satisfying approach to analyzing the differing awards.
122. �=-.364; t=-2.854; p=.005
123. In addition, courts can force a remittitur of the damage award or order a. new trial
on damages when the jury verdict is excessive. See, e.g. , Celeritas Tech., Ltd. v. Rockwell
Int'! Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (ordering remittitur of jury verdict from
$57,658,000 to $17,484,160); Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 540 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) Gury verdict of $55,634,153 remitted to $14,000,000); AccuScan, Inc. v. Xerox
Corp., No. 96 Civ. 2579(HB), 1998 WL 603217, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1998) (granting new
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D. Appeals
Frankly, I don 't know why I'm so excited about trying to bring this thing
[patent suit] to closure. It goes to the Federal Circuit afterwards. You
know, it's hard to deal with things that are ultimately resolved by people
wearing propeller hats. But we'll just have to see what happens when we
give it to them. I could say that with impunity because they've reversed
everything I've ever done, so I expect fully they 'll reverse this, too.

- Judge Samuel B. Kent124
In order to assess the "accuracy" of the factfinder's decisions, the
following issues were considered: how many of the final j udgments
were appealed, which issues were appealed, and the affirmance and
reversal rates by issue and by adjudicator. Overall, district court rever
sal rates for all cases appealed to the Federal Circuit for each calendar
year are as follows:

Year

% reversed

1993
1994
1995
1996
1 997
1998

26%
31%
17%
13%
29%
19%

The data from this study should have demonstrated a considerably
lower reversal rate than these overall rates because the data set was
limited to issues resolved at trial by a factfinder. Such factual issues
would be subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review for fact
findings by the bench125 and the substantial evidence standard of re
view for factfindings by the jury.126 These deferential standards of re
view should result in a greater number of overall affirmances (lower
reversal rates) by the Federal Circuit than in cases resolved on disposi
tive motions (such as summary judgment), where the standard of re-

trial on damages because jury award of $40,000,000 relied on an impermissible basis). Al
though the courts do not have the power to order a remittitur they effectively do so by issu
ing an order that states that if the parties do not accept a remittitur of $x, then a new trial on
the issue of damages will be granted because the jury verdict was excessive and not sup
ported by the evidence. This data set reports the awards actually granted by the jury, not the
amounts as modified by the judge.
124. 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No. 95-CV-1 13 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996). Judge Samuel
B. Kent made this statement during a summary judgment hearing. Interestingly, the "pro
peller hats" at the Federal Circuit affirmed the judge this time. See O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co.,
1 15 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
125. See, e.g., Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (stating that factfindings made during a bench trial are reviewed for clear error).
126. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 172 F.3d
1361, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reviewing jury factfindings to ascertain whether they are sup
ported by substantial evidence).
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view would be de novo. But such was not the case. Although the "sub
stantial evidence" standard (for juries' findings) is, in theory, more
deferential than the "clear error" standard (for judges' findings), there
is no practical difference that would predict different affirmance rates
under the two standards.127 The tables below contain appeal results
from the data set of tried cases. The first table contains the number of
cases and issues appealed and overall affirmance and reversal rates.128
TABLE 6

All Decisions
Cases Appealed
Cases Not Appealed
Issues Appealed129
Affirmance
Reversal

Decided By Jury

Decided By Judge

620 (51 % )

230 (43%)

390 (58%)

589 (49% )

303 (57% )

286 (42%)

1261

490

771

78% (979)

78% (381)

78% (598)

22% (282)

22% (109)

22% (173)

The results are remarkable. The Federal Circuit affirms judge fact
findings in 78% of all judge issues appealed and affirms j ury factfind
ings in 78% of all jury issues appealed.130 These data indicate that the
Federal Circuit upholds the findings of both types of adjudicators at
the same rate, suggesting that jury factfindings are no less "accurate"
than judge factfindings, as measured by appellate affirmance rate.
Perhaps the appellate affirmance rate over time could help explain
the increased demand for jury resolution of patent cases.131 Yet, as

127. See United States v. Hill, 196 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) ("Basically
there is deferential review and non-deferential (plenary) review, and whether deferential
review is denominated for 'abuse of discretion' or 'clear error' or 'substantial evidence' or
any of the other variants (with the exception of 'mere scintilla of evidence') that courts use
makes little practical difference."); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1041 (1956) ("I know, however, that there are conscientious judges
who find difficulty in deriving for themselves the distinction between 'clearly erroneous' and
the present 'substantial evidence' rule.").
128. In this study, an issue is counted as reversed if the adjudicator got it wrong, mean
ing that the appeals court reversed or vacated the decision because of an error by the adjudi
cator. Hence, any decision by the Federal Circuit vacating an issue and remanding it because
it was wrongly decided by the adjudicator is treated as a reversal. When an issue is vacated
simply because it need not be decided by the Federal Circuit (such as when an infringement
finding is vacated because the patent is held invalid), it is not included in this study.
129. No percentage is given for issues appealed versus issues resolved by district courts
because it would be too difficult to ascertain this information. For example, if the Federal
Circuit held a patent invalid, it need not resolve other appealed issues (enforceability, in
fringement, willfulness). Since I could not verify that the issues resolved were in fact the only
issues appealed, this percentage is left blank.
130. Of course, there is some selection bias inherent in these figures. Not all cases get
appealed.
131. The appellate affirmation rates in Figure 7 are only for tried cases. They do not in
clude appeals from summary judgments or cases resolved prior to adjudication by the fact
finder.
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Figure 7 indicates, there has been no improved "accuracy" as meas
ured by Federal Circuit affirmance over time of jury trials that ex
plains their increased demand.132
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Appeals By Substantive Issue

In order to examine further the affirmance rate of the adjudicators
on appeal, the 1261 appealed issues are broken up by subject matter.
As Figure 8 indicates, the issues most frequently addressed on appeal
are infringement and validity. These data do not correspond directly to
the overall frequency with which particular issues are appealed be
cause not all appealed issues are actually decided by the court. In
many cases in the data set, several issues were appealed but the Fed
eral Circuit limited its review to what was necessary to resolve the
case. For example, an appeal might be made on validity, enforceabil
ity, and infringement by the party who lost on those issues, and the
Federal Circuit might hold the patent invalid and not reach the other
issues. The category "?," which comprises 3 % of appealed issues, rep
resents summary affirmances for which I was unable to obtain briefs to
ascertain the issues appealed.133

132. The wildly divergent affirrnance rates for 1999 only reflect cases decided by the
Federal Circuit as of October 31, 2000. Any Federal Circuit opinions issued after this date
are not included in the dataset. It should be noted that the appeals process can be quite
lengthy and many appeals of cases resolved by trial in 1998 or 1999 may not have been re
solved as of this date.
133. To determine what issues were being appealed in Rule 36 summary affirrnance
cases, I obtained the briefs from the Federal Circuit archives. The 3 % figure represents the
appeals for which the briefs could not be found and which were likely lost due to a flood at
the Federal Circuit.
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TABLE 7

Validity Aff'd
Infringement Affd
Enforcement Affd
Willfulness Aff'd

All Decisions

Jury

Judge

78% (443)
80% (500)
76% (172)
85 % (98)

78% (166)
77% (225)
75 % (44)
94% (32)

77% (277)
82% (275)
76% (128)
80% (66)

The appellate affirmance rates for judge and jury resolution of the
substantive issues of validity, infringement, and enforceability are al
most identical. The affirmance rate for willful infringement is consid
erably higher when the jury finds willfulness. Is the jury more "accu
rate" at assessing bad intent than the judge? Jury findings of
willfulness alone have little meaning in an infringement litigation un
less the judge agrees to enhance the damage award as a result. As dis
cussed above, judges are a significant check on juries' willfulness find
ings and are much more likely to enhance their own willfulness
findings.134 It is therefore unsurprising that willfulness findings by the
jury generally are appealed only when the judge enhances damages.135
Because virtually all jury willfulness findings that are appealed have
actually been endorsed both by the jury, who made the finding, and by
the judge, who decided the willfulness warranted enhanced damages, it
is not surprising that these findings have a higher appellate affirmance
rate.

134. Judges enhanced damages in 95% of the cases in which they themselves found will
fulness, but only 63% of the cases in which the jury found willfulness.
135. The issue of willfulness was appealed in 98 instances in the data. In 70 instances, a
finding of willfulness by the factfinder was challenged on appeal. In 28 instances, a finding of
no willfulness was appealed. Where willfulness was challenged on appeal the court below
had enhanced damages 92 % of the time.
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There are several points worth noting about these appellate affir
mance rates. First, the standards of review for the various issues differ
but are generally very deferential. Infringement and willfulness are
fact questions that would be reviewed under the substantial evidence
standard for jury findings and the clearly erroneous standard for judge
findings. As previously discussed, there is not much practical differ
ence between these standards. Validity is a question of law which is
reviewed de novo regardless of adjudicator. Certain types of validity
decisions, such as obviousness, however, are questions of law based on
underlying facts determined by the factfinder and those facts are re
viewed under the deferential standards for each adjudicator. Enforce
ability is an equitable consideration which is reviewed under the
abuse-of-discretion standard of review. These very deferential stan
dards of review make appellate review far from an "accuracy" meter.
Second, there is a significant difference between what these two
adjudicators give the Federal Circuit to review. Judges are required by
Rule 52(a) to articulate their findings of fact and conclusions of law.136
Hence, the appellate court has a detailed roadmap of the district court
judge's decision. The judge's findings, decisions, and reasoning are
open to scrutiny by the appellate court. If the j udge made erroneous
factfindings or misapplied the law, the Federal Circuit can correct
these errors on appeal. The jury's findings, however, cannot be dis
sected and reviewed by the appellate court, because the jury is not re
quired to articulate reasoning for its judgments. In fact, the Federal
Circuit has concluded that it lacks supervisory power over the district
courts137 and therefore cannot even mandate the use of special verdict

136. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
137. See In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("This court has no ad
ministrative authority over any district court."); In re Oximetrix, 748 F.2d 637, 643 (Fed. Cir.

November 2000)

Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases

401

forms or general verdicts with interrogatoriesY8 Although special ver
dict forms are used in most patent trials, most of them are very general
in nature and give no insight into the jury findings on particular issues.
The special verdict might simply ask, "Did the defendant prove the
patent obvious by clear and convincing evidence?" Seldom do the spe
cial verdict forms actually force the jury to answer questions regarding
the underlying facts. These sorts of verdicts are sometimes referred to
as black box verdicts. With no insight into the jury's factfindings or
reasoning underlying the verdict, how then can the Federal Circuit re
view the verdict on appeal?
The Federal Circuit reviews black box j ury verdicts by presuming
that the jury found all facts in the record in support of the verdict it
chose.139 This evaluative process makes it much more difficult to over
turn the black box j ury verdicts on appeal than it is to overturn a j udge
verdict with its detailed factfindings and reasoning. This review proc
ess may mask errors in jury comprehension of the technology at issue
and potential flaws in the application of the law to the facts. For this
reason, appellate affirmance rates provide little insight into the "accu
racy" of jury decisionmaking. Given deferential standards of review, a
lack of transparency in jury findings, and inability to mandate special
verdicts, the Federal Circuit has limited ability to identify and correct
jury inadequacies.

1984) ("This court lacks the general authority over district courts exercisable, for example,
under 28 U.S.C. § 332."); Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1552
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Unlike other Circuit Courts of Appeal, we have no direct supervisory
authority over district courts.") (citation omitted).
138. In Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co. , the court noted:
This court has counselled district courts in appeals to us that specific answers from the jury
on factual issues are desirable, and has praised courts which have provided comprehensive
opinions in ruling on motions for JNOV. The decision of an appellate court is likely to be
better focused when it is assisted in this manner. Otherwise the task of review may be unnec
essarily comprehensive. Nevertheless, it must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court
what form of verdict to request of a jury. Thus, we have held that a trial court may, with
proper instructions, present a patent case to a jury for a general verdict encompassing all of
the issues of validity and infringement or may ask for a general answer on one or more spe
cific legal issues, such as obviousness, a practice not specifically provided for in the Federal
Rules.
749 F.2d 707, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); see also American Hoist & Derrick Co.
v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
139. [In reviewing] a jury special verdict on patent claim obviousness where the underlying
facts have been disputed . . . [w]e first presume that the jury resolved the underlying factual
disputes in favor of the verdict winner and leave those presumed findings undisturbed if they
are supported by substantial evidence. Then we examine the legal conclusion de novo to see
whether it is correct in light of the presumed jury factfindings.
Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
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Problems with Jury Resolution of Issues That Can Be
Teased Out of the Data

As the statistical data thus far have shown, juries may harbor some
of the biases that popular perceptions about them suggest. Juries do
find for the patent holder more often on validity, infringement, and
willfulness issues and they do award somewhat higher damages. The
magnitude of the differences is much smaller than many might have
anticipated, however. This could be explained in part by the economic
models of selection effect theory, which suggest that known biases
ought not to appear in the outcome data for tried cases because these
biases would have been factored into the parties' estimations and deci
sions regarding settlement. Because tried cases are not a random sub
set of all disputes, I would not expect outcome data to reflect real bi
ases or incompetence that may exist.
If I stopped here, I might conclude that the data have not substan
tiated significant reasons for concern about jury competence. There
are other ways, however, to evaluate and assess the statistical data to
ascertain whether they suggest that there are problems with jury
resolution of patent cases. The remainder of this Part performs that
evaluation.

1.

Winning is All or Nothing: Correlation Between Validity and
Infringement of Same Patent

Many believe that juries vote for parties rather than decide issues,
and that tangential issues sway decisionmaking.140 In order to test this
idea, I looked at how many patent claims get decided all for a single
party, and how many produce mixed results on validity and infringe
ment, and what happens when there are multiple patents being tried.
In evaluating each case where the factfinder considered both in
fringement and validity issues for the same patent, I determined in
what percentage of cases the factfinder found for the same party on
both issues. The chart below shows the possible choices:

VALID
INFRINGED

VALID
NOT INFRINGED

INVALID
INFRINGED

INVALID
NOT INFRINGED

If the factfinder found the patent valid and infringed or invalid and not
infringed, then those claims would be counted as a verdict for the same
party. If the factfinder found the patent invalid but infringed or valid

140. See supra notes 14-36 and accompanying text.
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but not infringed, then the claim would be counted as a mixed result.141
As Figure 10 indicates, j uries are much more likely than are j udges to
find for the same party when multiple issues need to be resolved. Ju
ries find for the same party in 86% of all instances where they resolve
both validity and infringement. Judges find for the same party only
of the time. This difference in how j udges and juries resolve mul
tiple issues regarding a single patent claim is statistically significant.142

74%

2.

Winning is All or Nothing: Multiple Claims

In 301 of the 1209 suits in the data set (25% ) , the trial involved two
or more patents or alleged infringement by two or more distinct prod
ucts.143 I expected a correlation in outcome of multiple claims, because
generally when multiple patents are asserted, they are related patents
with similar limitations and similar infringement analysis. This ex
pected correlation did not, however, predict the difference between
j udge and jury resolution of multiple claim cases which the data re
vealed.

141. It may seem strange that a factfinder would find the patent invalid, yet still go on to
determine infringement. It is more efficient, however, to have the factfinder resolve all issues
at once in case the appellate court overturns one issue. If the factfinder does not determine
infringement when it finds a patent invalid, then if the appellate court reverses on validity, it
must remand for a second trial to determine infringement. If the factfinder finds the patent
invalid and still determines whether there was infringement, there is no need for a second
trial, even if the appellate court reverses the invalidity determination.
142. �=.117; t=4.469; p=.000
143. Multiple claim cases in this data set are cases in which multiple patents were tried
or multiple distinct products were alleged to infringe. If multiple products were accused of
infringement, but they shares identical traits (a single claim term, for example, would resolve
the infringement issue for all products) for purposes of the patent infringement analysis, the
case was not treated as one involving multiple claims. In such a case, the factfinder's single
infringement finding determined the outcome of all claims.
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Judges reached mixed results with significantly greater frequency
than j uries, which decided cases in an all-or-nothing fashion. When the
jury resolved multiple claims, in 87% of the cases it would resolve all
the claims for the same party, while judges resolved all claims for the
same party 72 % of the time.

Adjudicator Gudge or jury) is a statistically significant predictor of
whether multiple issues and multiple claims will get resolved for the
same party or with mixed results.144 These data may indicate that juries
are less able to understand the subtle technical differences which
would result in mixed conclusions, while judges may be more subtle at
resolving claims issue-by-issue rather than suit-by-suit.

3.

Declaratory Judgment Actions

A perception exists that the alleged infringer will achieve some ad
vantage by filing a declaratory judgment action against the patentee
rather than waiting for the patentee to file an infringement suit. By
filing the declaratory judgment action, the alleged infringer is able to
choose the forum (the one it thinks most sympathetic to it) and the
time that the suit will begin (enabling it to surprise the patentee and
force it to litigate before it might be ready).
Of the 1209 cases in the data set, 14% (168 cases) were declaratory
j udgment actions brought by the alleged infringer.145 Of the 1676 sepa
rate claims, 15% (243) were declaratory j udgment claims.

144. �=.149; t=3.261; p=.001
145. A case is considered a declaratory judgment action if the suit was filed by the al
leged infringer. These statistics do not include counterclaim declaratory judgment actions.
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TABLE S

TOTAL
Patentee Wins Claim
Infringer Wins Claim
Valid
Invalid
Enforceable
Unenforceable
Infringed
Not I nfringed
Willful
Not Willful

Cases Filed By Patentee

Cases Filed By Infringer

1433
58%
42%
71%
29%
76%
24%
68%
32%
65%
35%

243
44% (106)
56% (137)
50% (91 )
50% (92)
56% (45)
44% (36)
51 % (93)
49% (88)
58% (33)
42% (24)

827 1
606)
6851
284)
342)
107)
794)
380)
316
173

Who files the suit (patentee or alleged infringer) is a statistically

significant predictor of who wins patent claims.146 It is also a statisti
cally significant predictor of validity,147 enforceability,148 and infringe
ment, 149 but not willfulness.150
When these results are broken down by adjudicator, there are sig
nificant differences. Who filed the suit is a statistically significant pre
dictor of who wins patent claims in j ury trials,151 but not in bench tri
als.152 The difference for j ury trials may occur because: (1) there is
some advantage gained by the choice of forum; (2) the infringer bene
fits from determining when the lawsuit begins; or (3) the j ury is less
likely to be biased in favor of the patentee when the infringer brings
suit rather than the patentee. If popular perception is accurate, juries
are more likely to find for the patent holder when they perceive her as
the injured party seeking vindication. When the infringer brings suit,
the patent holder may appear to be less of a victim and the infringer
less of a villain.153

146. �=.141; t=4.106; p=.000
147. �=-.210; t=-5.618; p=.000
148. �=-.206; t=-3.895; p=.000
149. �=-.163; t=-4.306; p=.000
150. �=-.067; t=-1.0; p=.318
151. �=.298; t=6.168; p=.000
152. �=.005; t=.113; p=.910
153. In most cases, the patent holder who files a counterclaim for infringement, not the
declaratory judgment plaintiff, will proceed first at trial. During argument or witness exami
nation, however, the declaratory judgment plaintiff could likely make the jury aware that it,
not the patent holder, filed the suit.
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Breaking the claims down by substantive issue merely echoes the
outcome findings. In jury trials, who files suit is a statistically signifi
cant predictor of validity, enforceability, and infringement, but not
willfulness. In bench trials, however, who files suit is not a statistically
significant predictor for resolution of any of the substantive issues.
Namely there is no obvious impact in the outcome data of j udge reso
lution of declaratory j udgment actions versus patent infringement
suits.
Fig. 1 3: Jury: Patentee Win .Rates By Who Flies Sult
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These data suggest that forum selection may impact outcome. Per
haps most significantly, the data imply that juries, but not judges, are
much more sympathetic to the patent holder when the patent holder
brings the infringement suit and much less so when the accused in
fringer seeks declaratory j udgment.
F.

Multivariate Regression Model

A multivariate regression model has been used to isolate the ef
fects of several independent variables on patent-holder win rate.154 The
dependent variable is patent-holder win rate (win or lose) and the in
dependent variables are adjudicator Uudge or jury), year of judgment,
and who filed suit (patent holder or accused infringer). Multivariate
regression facilitates examination of the separate effect of each inde
pendent variable on the dependent variable (patent-holder win rate)
- that is, the statistical significance of each independent variable in
predicting patent-holder win rate.
TABLE 9

Independent Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

Significance (p)

Adjudicator
Year of Judgment
Who Brought Suit (patentee or infringer)
Constant

.6118
.0060
.5700

.1055
.0107
.1417

.0000
.5743
.0001

-12.571

21.251

.5542

x'=52.335, df=3, p=.oooo
pseudo r-squared=.031; log likelihood = 2249.51; Number of Claims=1948
154. A logistic, rather than a linear, regression model is used because the dependent
variable, patent-holder win rate, is binary or dichotomous (win or loss). See DAVID W.
HOSMER, JR. & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 1 (1989).
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Table 9 shows that who adjudicates the case Qudge or j ury) and
who files the case (patent holder or accused infringer) are significant
predictors of the patent-holder win rate, but the year of the judgment
is not a significant predictor of patent-holder win rates. When all these
variables are held constant in the regression, who adjudicates the case,
j udge or j ury, continues to have a significant effect on patent-holder
win rate.
The logistic regression makes possible estimation of the magnitude
of the effect on outcome produced by each independent variable. Us
ing the coefficients from Table 9, one can calculate the approximate
change in win rate attributable to who is adjudicating the case. Com
pared to a bench trial, in which the patent holder has a 50% chance of
winning, the patent holder in an identical case tried to a jury has a
65 % chance of winning.155 Compared to a case in which the accused
infringer filed suit, where the patent holder has a 50% chance of win
ning, when the patent holder files the suit the chance of winning in
creases to 64 % .

CONCLUSIONS
In this Article, a database of all tried patent cases from 1983 to
has been used to test popular perceptions of juror bias and in
competence and academic predictions of win rates. At times, the sta
tistical results do validate some popular perceptions about j udges and
juries. Patent holders have been more successful in jury trials than in
bench trials. Juries find for the patent holder more often on validity,

1999

infringement, and willfulness issues and they do award higher dam
ages. The magnitude of the differences, however, is much smaller than
many might have anticipated. In addition, there are no significant dif
ferences in outcome data from judge and j ury trials on the issue of en
forceability of the patents confounding popular perception.
This could be explained by the economic models of selection effect
theory which suggest that known biases ought not to appear in the
outcome data for tried cases because these biases would have been
factored into the parties' estimations and decisions regarding settle
ment. Because tried cases are not a random subset of all disputes, I
would not expect outcome data accurately to reflect real biases or in
competence that may exist.
Concerns that juries are incompetent to resolve patent cases seem
unsubstantiated by the results at first blush. Judges and juries are af-

155. Magnitude is calculated by taking the anti-log of the coefficient. For example, the
coefficient for adjudicator is .6118. e0'1"=1.844. With all other variables constant, jury resolu
tion changes the odds of the patent holder winning from 1:1 to 1.844:1. This corresponds to a
probability of winning of 65% (1.844/(1.844+1)). See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1 120, 1 131-32 & n.25 (1996)
(explaining the mechanics of regression analysis).
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firmed on appeal with equal frequency. The problem with using out
come data and appellate affirmance rate as a measure of j uror compe
tency may lie in the lack of transparency of black-box jury verdicts
combined with the deferential standards of review. It may be that the
appellate affirmance rate and outcome data do not tell the whole
story.
Closer scrutiny of j udge and j ury decisionmaking elucidates differ
ences which could implicate flaws in j uror comprehension. Juries do
not delineate issues in patent cases whether it be infringement and va
lidity or infringement of multiple patents. Juries decide patent cases on
an all-or-nothing basis more frequently than j udges do. Jury decisions
in declaratory j udgment actions are also problematic. The patent
holder has a significantly greater win rate in actions brought by the
patent holder than in declaratory judgment actions brought by the in
fringer. If this were true for both judge and jury trials, one could con
clude that infringers only bring the action when they have stronger
cases. There is no difference, however, in win rates in j udge trials be
tween infringement actions and declaratory judgment actions.
The most plausible explanation of the data is that there are some
differences in j udge and j ury resolution of patent cases. Because the
database of tried cases is not a random or representative sampling of
all patent disputes, however, it is impossible to quantify these differ
ences beyond the results disclosed. It may be that the biases implicated
by the outcome data can be identified because there has been a dra
matic rise in demand for jury trials of patent cases. The parties' out
come estimations have a higher error rate because of the sudden in
creased demand for j uror resolution of patent cases. If this explanation
is correct, jury outcome data should tend towards 50% as parties get
better at predicting outcome when j uries are involved. This, of course,
presumes that j ury decisionmaking will become more predictable over
time. Only time will tell.

